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EMERGENCY SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1973

DECEMBER 6, 1973.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
submitted the following

R E P O R T

together with

MINORITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 11088]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 11088) to provide emergency security assistance authorizations for Israel and Cambodia, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendments are as follows:

On page 2, beginning in line 1, strike out "and not to exceed \$200,000,000 for emergency military assistance for Cambodia." and insert in lieu thereof the following:

of which sum amounts in excess of \$1,500,000,000 may be used pursuant to this section or section 4 of this Act only if the President (1) determines it to be important to our national interest that Israel receive assistance hereunder exceeding \$1,500,000,000, and (2) reports to Congress each such determination (if more than one) at least twenty days prior to date on which funds are obligated or expended under this Act in excess of such \$1,500,000,000 limitation. The twenty-day requirement contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply if hostilities are renewed in the Middle East. The President shall include in his report the amount of funds to be used pursuant to the determination, the terms of the additional assistance under section 2 or section 4, and the justification for the determination. All information contained in the justification shall be public information except to the

extent that the President concludes that publication would be incompatible with the security interests of the United States.

On page 2, immediately after line 23, insert the following:

SEC. 5. The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict to ascertain the effectiveness of the foreign military assistance program as it relates to the Middle East conflict, including weapons that the United States is providing to Israel through foreign assistance programs, and to compare them to the effectiveness of the weapons which the Soviet Union is providing to the Arab states. In conducting such study and submitting such report, the Secretary shall take care not to disclose, directly or indirectly, intelligence sources or methods or confidential information received from any other nation. A report of the conclusions of such study shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practical and in any case not later than December 31, 1974.

SEC. 6. Of the funds appropriated pursuant to section 2, the President may use such sums as may be necessary from time to time for payment by the United States of its share of the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, as apportioned by the United Nations in accordance with Article 17 of the United Nations Charter.

PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST

The President sent to the Congress a message dated October 19, 1973, requesting authorization of \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance for Israel and \$200 million for Cambodia in fiscal 1974. The President said "This request is necessary to permit the United States to follow a responsible course of action in two areas where stability is vital if we are to build a global structure of peace." Under his proposal, the President would determine how much of the emergency assistance for Israel would be in grant military assistance and how much in foreign military sales credits. The entire amount for Cambodia would be in grant military assistance.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The message from the President, dated October 19, 1973, requesting authorization of appropriations for emergency security assistance for Israel and Cambodia, together with a draft of proposed legislation for those purposes, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed (H. Doc. 93-170) on October 23, 1973.

The proposed legislation (H.R. 11088) was introduced (by request) on October 24, 1973, by the Honorable Thomas E. Morgan, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

On October 29, and again on November 28, the committee was briefed by the Secretary of State, the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, about developments in the Middle East. In the second briefing, the Secretary stressed the need for prompt action on this authorizing legislation.

The committee held an open hearing on H.R. 11088 on November 30, 1973, at which testimony was received from the Honorable Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State; the Honorable William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On December 3, 1973, the committee heard testimony from Admiral Moorer and from the Honorable Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in executive session and received classified material.

On December 3 and December 4, the committee marked up the bill, H.R. 11088, and on December 4 ordered it favorably reported with amendments by a vote of 33 to 1.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS

A. CAMBODIA, PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION AND REPORTING

The committee deleted from H.R. 11088 the proposed \$200 million for emergency military assistance for Cambodia. This action was taken in view of the conference report on S. 1443, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which renewed for fiscal year 1974 the President's special authority to draw down defense articles from U.S. defense stocks. The conferees on S. 1443 stated their intent that up to \$200 million of the emergency military assistance requirements for Cambodia be furnished pursuant to this drawdown authority.

The committee also included language in the bill placing certain restrictions on the use of assistance authorized in section 2, in excess of \$1.5 billion. Prior to the obligation or expenditure of such assistance, the President will be required to make a determination and to report it to the Congress, together with a justification therefor. The 20-day notification specified in the amendment shall not apply if hostilities are renewed in the Middle East. The report shall also give the date that the transfer of United States defense articles provided in excess of \$1.5 billion becomes effective.

B. STUDY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The second committee amendment directs the Secretary of Defense to undertake a study to ascertain the effectiveness of the foreign military assistance program as it relates to the Middle East conflict, and to report his findings to the Congress promptly but not later than December 31, 1974.

It is the intention of the committee that the Secretary of Defense shall request that those Military Services and Intelligence Agencies which he deems relevant, contribute information and expert opinion, but that the conclusions reported to the Congress shall be his.

It is further the committee's intent that, in conducting such study, the Secretary shall obtain the fullest possible information on the military events during such conflict; that he shall assess the effectiveness of the weapons, doctrines, and tactics used by all combatants; that he shall compare such weapons, doctrines, and tactics to those used by the United States and by such other major nations as he deems relevant; and that he shall, where possible, consider the program unit cost of such weapons in reaching his conclusions.

C. UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

The third committee amendment authorizes the President to use such sums as may be necessary, from the amounts appropriated pursuant to section 2, for payment of the United States share of the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

While the executive branch has requested a separate authorization for this purpose, the committee believes that this obligation can be met under this legislation without impairing its basic intent. The presence of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East constitutes a vital part of the effort to prevent the resumption of hostilities, and to enable peaceful negotiations to move ahead. The authorization contained in section 6 of the bill will serve these purposes and is fully in keeping with the basic objectives of this emergency legislation.

Information supplied by the executive branch indicates that the cost of the U.N. Emergency Force may amount to \$30 million for the first 6 months and \$5 million each month thereafter. The United States share will be \$17,336,200, based on the U.N. Secretary General's estimate of \$60 million for the first full fiscal period of the Force's operation. This represents approximately 28.9 per cent of the estimated total cost.

PURPOSE

The purpose of H.R. 11088, as amended, is to help maintain a military balance necessary for the achievement of peace in the Middle East, through authorizing \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance to Israel in fiscal 1974.

BACKGROUND

Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East on October 6, 1973, the United States sought to bring about a ceasefire and reach an understanding with the Soviet Union for a mutual freeze on resupply of major weapons in that area. When these efforts failed, and in the face of massive Soviet resupply of Arab forces, it became clear that the United States would have to send arms to Israel to replace combat losses and maintain a balance of forces in the Middle East.

The United States, therefore, responded promptly to Israel's request for replacement arms. It sold nearly \$1 billion worth to Israel, most of which already has been delivered by airlift and by sea.

According to executive branch testimony received by the committee, the American action played a vital role in the achievement of the October 22 cease-fire agreement and in promoting conditions for the serious discussions now underway looking toward a stable peace.

The committee has received testimony that Israel's relative military strength is now about the same as it was on October 6. Her military equipment losses sustained during the fighting have been replaced.

However, the military balance is not at a standstill. Soviet arms deliveries to the Arabs are continuing. Israel has indicated requirements for further military equipment totaling nearly \$2 billion, in addition to the \$1 billion worth already provided by the United States.

A U.S. Department of Defense team has made an on-the-spot assessment of Israel's needs. Its detailed findings have been made available

to the committee. Because of the sensitive nature of this specific information concerning military strength, the material remains classified for the time being. The Department of Defense estimates, however, that Israel may need additional arms totaling somewhat more than \$1 billion.

A MILITARY BALANCE PROMOTES PEACE

The executive branch has assured the committee that maintaining a military balance between Israel and her Arab adversaries is an essential element in providing a setting for negotiations which could lead to an enduring peace.

An imbalance of power can tempt the stronger party to take by force what it cannot gain at the negotiating table, and dissuade the weaker party from making compromises because its margin of security leaves little room for concession.

This bill is designed to assure Israel the security she needs. It is designed to demonstrate unmistakably to Arab states and the Soviet Union that the United States will provide Israel with weapons essential for Israel's self-defense. As Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush testified to the committee:

The purpose of the legislation before you is to make it clear that the military option . . . is no longer viable. This legislation will provide firm evidence of American support against aggression and of our willingness to help create a situation in which negotiations leading to a lasting peace can take place.

AMERICA'S INTEREST IN A MIDDLE EAST PEACE

The rewards to the United States of a permanent settlement in the Middle East would be substantial, as they would be for the nations of that area.

For more than a quarter of a century, the Middle East has been a potential tinderbox for world conflict. Even without direct superpower combat involvement, Middle East instability and wars have been costly to the people of that region, to the United States and to other countries.

The oil crisis which has followed on the heels of the most recent hostilities in the Middle East, demonstrates the disturbing effect which a war in one region can have on the economies of other regions.

Moreover, it is not in the U.S. interest to permit Soviet dominance in this strategic area which stands athwart historic commercial cross-roads. Neither the United States, nor any of the nations of the Middle East, desires great power mastery over them.

The United States has an abiding special friendship for Israel which dates back to her birth as a nation. As Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger recently stated:

The United States has supported Israel because of the emotional ties that have existed, because of the democratic tradition of Israel, because of the fact that it is a going concern in this area, and because, as I have said, about our opposition to the domination of one nation by force by others.

The committee believes an enduring peace in the Middle East to be in the highest U.S. national interest. It supports efforts to achieve a long-term settlement, of which this bill is a part.

The committee also favors further U.S. efforts to obtain an agreement from the Soviet Union on curbing military deliveries to the Middle East, and believes this bill to be helpful toward that end.

THE FINANCIAL BURDEN

The high cost of maintaining the Middle East military balance now is due to the large war losses and the expense of increasingly sophisticated weaponry used, coupled with the massiveness of the Soviet resupply.

Israel so far has paid for her U.S. arms purchases with cash and credit, not grants. Under existing law, she has a 120-day grace period before she must pay for the nearly \$1 billion in U.S. military equipment obtained since October 6. The payments come due in February-March 1974.

The committee has received detailed information about Israel's economic situation. It shows that Israel cannot pay for these replacement arms and the additional amounts which may be needed without straining her economy to the breaking point. And without a functioning economy, Israel would be as insecure as if she lacked arms.

Israel already carried a heavy defense burden before the war. More than one quarter of her gross national product went for defense last year. Her taxpayers are reported to be paying the highest rate in the world. Her foreign debt was about \$4 billion, more than \$1,200 per capita. She owed the United States, at the time of the outbreak of hostilities, about \$1.7 billion for cash and credit purchases of military equipment.

The war dealt Israel's economy a heavy blow. About 25 percent of her work force is mobilized, with consequent effects in disrupting production. Her ability to earn foreign exchange is impaired. And, she is unable to return fully to peacetime pursuits until she has more assurance than now exists that hostilities will not break out again.

Deputy Secretary Clements testified that without financial assistance, there is a possibility that Israel will default on the \$1 billion due next February-March. If this happens, he stated, the U.S. military departments may not be reimbursed for the costs already incurred by them for the deliveries to Israel and on-going contracts with the U.S. defense industry in turn may have to be cancelled.

No precise dollar figure is available for the huge Soviet deliveries to the Arabs. However repayment terms obviously are not holding up the flow. Deputy Secretary Clements stated that the Soviets have demonstrated an "absolutely open spigot" with their shipments.

The committee is convinced, on the basis of both the public and classified information available, that Israel must have substantial financial assistance to maintain the military strength needed for her defense and for the Middle East balance.

RESTRICTIONS, SAFEGUARDS AND GUIDELINES

At the same time, the committee serves notice that this legislation will be no "open spigot" for Israel. The Executive is under injunction to spend no more than necessary to achieve a Middle East balance.

The committee notes with approval Deputy Secretary Clements' testimony that the full \$2.2 billion probably will not be needed, and that Israel's \$3 billion weapons request list is being thoroughly scrubbed down.

Furthermore, it is the sincere hope of the committee that the amounts in excess of \$1.5 billion referred to in section 2, as amended, may not be necessary for military expenditures. It is the hope and intent of the committee that the executive branch will therefore consider returning to the Congress at an appropriate time to request authorization of such amounts to stimulate the creation of a Middle East Regional Development Bank.

As envisioned, such funds would be matched or augmented by contributions from the principal countries of the area and other world powers, including the Soviet Union. The effective operation of such a Middle East Regional Development Bank would greatly assist in promoting the social and economic development of the entire area, thereby creating a climate for true and lasting peace.

The committee stipulates that funds authorized in this legislation may be used only for emergency security assistance to Israel and purposes of section 6, and that any unused amounts will simply remain in the Treasury. Any sums for a Middle East Regional Development Bank would require a separate authorization.

Specifically, no funds authorized in this legislation may be transferred for other purposes by using the President's special authorities in section 614(a) or the transfer authority in section 610 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The committee also has received assurance that no Presidential impoundment of other appropriations will be undertaken as a result of this bill.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommends that \$2.2 billion be authorized for emergency security assistance to Israel in fiscal 1974 and for the U.S. share of the cost of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East.

A lesser amount, especially in face of the Presidential request, might be misconstrued abroad as a wavering in our support for Israel's defense and in our desire to see political negotiations produce a more stable and peaceful condition in the Middle East.

THE OIL ISSUE

The committee believes American foreign policy should not be hostage to producers of oil or any other commodity.

Enactment of this legislation will not invoke an Arab oil embargo against the United States. The embargo already has taken place.

This bill is aimed at promoting conditions for negotiations leading to a durable Middle East peace. If such a settlement is reached, a result may be improved prospects for American access to Arab oil.

COST ESTIMATES

H.R. 11088 authorizes appropriations of \$2.2 billion in fiscal year 1974. Outlays from this amount are estimated at \$600 million in fiscal year 1974 and the balance in succeeding years.

MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. H. R. GROSS

During the past year Congress has been giving it the old school try to reassert its role as a coequal branch of government. That's what the fight over impoundment and the war powers legislation was all about.

After a valiant march up the hill to attack Executive power, this bill greases the skids for a quick descent. Read the second sentence of section 3. It gives the President the right to use \$2.2 billion for aid to Israel on whatever terms and conditions he wishes.

Turn to section 4. In basic English it provides that if any of this money starts out as loans, the President can convert them to grants before the end of next June.

Now let's hear a cheer from those who have been worrying about the declining powers of Congress!

The little sweetener inserted by the committee that the President can hold back on \$700 million until he determines that it is in our national interest to use it and tells Congress about it adds nothing of substance to restrict this broad delegation of authority.

All of this, the committee was told and swallowed, was to insure "maximum flexibility" in disbursing this money. If ever there was congressional abdication over the purse, this is it.

This is an urgent measure the sponsors tell us. Yet the bill has been lying around for six weeks unmolested by the committee. Then on two days notice hearings were called and the bill moved with indecent haste. After putting in some worked-over weasel words, the committee simply rubber-stamped the President's request.

One would expect that with the delay in handling this bill the Executive would have been doing a lot of homework to justify the bill. Witnesses were not even able to tell the committee what were the shipping costs of materials already sent. None had much of an idea what the impact on U.S. energy requirements was for assistance already sent. While there was a grudging admission that the \$2.2 billion expenditure would have an inflationary impact, none hazarded even a guess what it would be.

Only \$1 billion of the \$2.2 billion was identified—and that was for equipment shipped to Israel since October 6, 1973. The balance is a down payment on a lengthening shopping list. The committee was assured that it can expect requests for additional funds.

No report has yet been received from the evaluation team sent to Israel to determine more accurately that country's needs. The replacement of equipment already sent has come from Defense stocks. When it is replaced with new equipment, it is estimated that the cost will be 25 percent greater than the original prices. "These deficits in new procurement funds will be requested from the Congress in the near future," Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements testified.

How does this sum fit into the President's budget which he complains is constantly being exceeded by the Congress? One witness read a reassuring statement from OMB that "this legislation will not force the Executive branch to reduce or impound any funds previously requested for other Federal programs." One can only wonder how much more loose change is floating around that can finance other programs without exceeding the tight budget.

Members may have overlooked the little sum of \$350 million in the conference report on foreign aid that the House adopted recently. That's additional to the amount in this bill.

When members receive hot letters from cold constituents, just tell them we are simply restoring the balance of power in the Middle East. It will give them great comfort. What with the gasoline shortage, they may even walk to the bus stop to welcome you home—permanently.

H. R. Gross.

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON.
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

I support the President's request for \$2.2 billion for assistance to Israel. I look on this measure as a practical investment toward permanent peace in the Middle East.

The committee is to be commended for the large degree of unanimity it has shown in reaffirming some basic positions in our foreign policy that some members on occasion have overlooked.

In this bill the committee recognizes that the security of a nation depends upon its military strength to deter aggression. This simple principle has often been slighted when aggression has occurred in other parts of the world.

This bill demonstrates the importance of our legislation governing arms sales. Without it we would have to give Israel the equipment it needs for its defense. With the arms sales legislation it is possible to sell the material to Israel.

As the testimony of witnesses and the statements of members make clear, Portugal has played a significant role in our assistance to Israel. Our ability to use the Azores made it possible to supply Israel more expeditiously than would otherwise have been the case. We should recognize the wisdom of those members of the other body who rejected the Case amendment that might have jeopardized our access to the Azores.

A permanent solution to the Middle East crisis is the major goal of U.S. foreign policy moves. I am hopeful that the peace conference in Geneva will produce a long overdue solution. However, we must not overlook the continued Soviet and, to a lesser degree, Red Chinese involvement in the Middle East and their support of guerrilla groups as well as of the emotionally charged Arab governments.

The committee has affirmatively responded to the President's request for an emergency authorization to resupply the Israeli armed forces. Obviously the military balance of power must be maintained in the Middle East as a basis for stimulating a permanent peace agreement.

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI.

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SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. PAUL FINDLEY

AMENDMENT NEEDED

This bill to provide \$2.2 billion in emergency assistance to Israel would be substantially improved by adding the following amendment:

Section 6. In addition to the maintenance of the balance of military power in the Middle East, the Military Assistance authorized herein for Israel is intended to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 (1973).

Inclusion of this language would show that the Congress, while ready to provide supplies for the defense of Israel, also fosters a just settlement to the Middle East dispute in which all parties accept certain fundamental conditions.

Former U.N. Ambassador Charles W. Yost strongly urges that this amendment be accepted.

Secretary of State Kissinger told the Committee he has no objections to an amendment of this type being included.

Support for the U.N. position originated under President Johnson and continues under President Nixon.

The amendment would not reduce by one penny the financial and military assistance for Israel authorized by this act. It would not extend financial or military assistance in any form to any Arab state. But it would do something vitally important: it would place the prestige of the House of Representatives behind fairness and even-handedness as the basis for our Middle East policy.

True, the bill as reported says nothing about policy. It is nevertheless thunderous as a policy document. It supports explicitly and implicitly only the military interests of Israel. It contemplates only a military solution to the problem.

Israel of course has interests which the United States should support, and for that reason I voted to report this bill. But so do other parties to the recent military conflict, namely, Egypt and Jordan, with which we have diplomatic relations, and Syria, with which we do not.

Testimony before the committee disclosed that, except for a few minor commando actions, all the fighting in October occurred on Arab land occupied by Israel since 1967. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, testified that he had no reason to believe the Arab states had military objectives in October extending beyond the recovery of these occupied lands. American intelligence reported that the Egyptian battle plan called for stopping at the June, 1967 borders and for not pressing the attack into Israel.

Two Presidents have recognized and supported the interest of Arab states, as well as Israel, by sponsoring and steadfastly supporting

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967 and Security Council Resolution 338 this year. Just two weeks ago Secretary of State Kissinger restated U.S. support for these two resolutions: "The United States has committed itself, in Security Council Resolution 338, to support the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts."

He went on to say: "We hope that Israel, as well as the Arab countries, will recognize that one of the clear consequences of recent events is that a purely military solution to the problems of the Middle East is impossible. . . ."

This bill, however, is silent on non-military solutions and Arab interests. It is advanced as necessary to "maintain the balance of power" in the Middle East, but Arab states could understandably interpret it as a bill to help maintain only the occupation of Arab lands.

The House should amend the bill in order to avoid such a misinterpretation. It should explicitly endorse the wise initiative toward a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict which two Presidents have advanced. The amendment I offered in committee will provide badly needed balance to this bill.

Here is the text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967:

RESOLUTION 242 (1967)

(Adopted by the Security Council at its 1282nd meeting,
on 22 November 1967)

The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation
in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Here is the text of U.S. Security Council Resolution 338 of this year:

RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

(Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting, on 21/22 October 1973)

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Unfortunately time did not permit the circulation of this amendment in advance of the brief committee consideration, and it was not accepted.

This legislation will be viewed worldwide as a major policy declaration by the House on what must be viewed as the most complicated and explosive international problem facing the world, namely, the Middle East confrontation. It therefore may influence, for good or ill, the outcome of that confrontation.

To the best of my knowledge, the Congress has not enacted a bill of any sort since the 1967 war which would be viewed as a policy statement on the Middle East. Indeed I cannot recall the Congress doing so since the 1958 Middle East Resolution, an act which has never been rescinded but nevertheless has been declared by the Executive Branch to be inoperative.

The bill now before the House will therefore be construed as a major policy declaration. It is now totally one-sided, hardly in accord with the spirit or the detail of Resolution 242. Acceptance of my amendment will show that the House supports the even-handed policy being pursued by the Administration in the Middle East. It will show that the House, while ready to supply the weapons of war for the defense

of Israel, also stands ready to foster a long-term peaceful settlement for all the countries of that region.

The policy importance of the bill derives partly from other characteristics.

It is immense. It provides more than twice as much military assistance for one country as was included for all foreign countries in the Foreign Assistance conference report just adopted this week. It is one of the largest military assistance bills the House has considered in recent years—by far the largest when Vietnam is excluded.

The Foreign Assistance bill contained \$963 million in military assistance for all countries. This bill contains \$2.2 billion for Israel alone, and the \$2.2 billion is in addition to \$300 million in military credit sales authorized in the Foreign Assistance bill.

The Foreign Assistance bill was before the committee for seven months. Ten days of hearings were held and more than 650 pages of testimony fill the hearing transcript of the House alone.

Hearings on the Emergency Assistance bill for Israel were not scheduled until last Friday. A second abbreviated day of hearings was held on Monday after which the committee immediately went into mark-up.

The only justification given to the committee for the money figure was to assist Israel in paying for approximately \$1 billion worth of military hardware which has already been delivered and is ready for use.

No justification for the other \$1.2 billion contained in this bill was given to the committee. It will be a giant contingency fund.

In addition, it is unknown just how much of the \$2.2 billion will be extended as credit and how much as grant. This is left entirely to Presidential discretion. In the Foreign Assistance Act just passed, Congress carefully spelled out to the dollar how much could be extended as credit and how much in grant.

Because of these remarkable characteristics, this bill has the potential for extraordinary impact as a policy document.

My amendment will provide needed balance. It will do no harm to the interests of Israel. Indeed, it should help the negotiating position of our diplomats and thus enhance the possibility that this massive provision of military assistance will actually become a powerful force for a just peace.

PAUL FINDLEY.

